Hytera - Experts & Thought Leaders

CeComunica, a Professional Mobile Radio (PMR) operator in Panama, is slated to launch in December a Digital Mobile Radio (DMR) Tier III trunking network supplied by Hytera, global provider of innovative PMR solutions. This new nationwide network will provide advanced and reliable mission and business critical communications services to a large number of users from sectors such as ports, airports, ground transportations, hospitality, retailing and security companies in Panama. DMR Tier III trunking network The DMR Tier III trunking network has been set up with 15 sites of Hytera DS-6210 base station and multiple models of industry-leading digital two-way radios from Hytera DMR portfolio, including PD6, PD7, PD9, X1, MD6, MD7 and its flagship Multi-mode Advanced Radio PDC760 which can provide high quality narrowband voice under DMR protocol and fast data transmission in LTE broadband. To realise the full capability and maximise the productivity, this network can interoperate with other communications systems of different technologies by adopting Hytera SmartOne solution. “We are excited to supply our DMR trunking system and facilitate CeComunica’s further penetration into the PMR operator business, and we have been looking forward to introducing more cutting-edge products and technologies for Panamanian users to increase productivity and security of their daily operation, as well as unexpected scenarios,” said Fernando Camelo, Regional Sales Director of Hytera.

Hytera, a global provider of innovative Professional Mobile Radio (PMR) communications solutions, announces that it has signed contracts with Secretariat of Public Security of the State of Alagoas, Brazil to provide TETRA communications infrastructure as the expansion of the statewide mission critical communications network and four-year maintenance service. The total contracts value is around 6.5 million US dollars with the infrastructure contract around 1.3 million and the service contract around 5.2 million. “We are excited being chosen as the equipment and service provider of Alagoas’s statewide TETRA system. The state authority shows confidence in Hytera’s ability to deliver advanced and reliable public safety communications networks. For the expansion, we presented the latest development of TETRA technologies,” said John Zhou, the General Manager of Hytera Brazil. “The new contracts as a milestone for Hytera Brazil recognise us not only as a leading TETRA solution provider, but also a trusted service provider, and it is the embodiment of Hytera transformation globally.” In early 2014 Hytera delivered TETRA infrastructure, terminals and dispatcher to the public safety users of State of Alagoas TETRA communications network In early 2014 Hytera delivered TETRA infrastructure, terminals and dispatcher to the public safety users of State of Alagoas, who were modernising its communications systems to better serve the communities and prepare for the global soccer fiesta, the World Cup 2014. The newly signed equipment contract includes 31 sites with Hytera’s latest TETRA innovation, DIB R5 base station. It adopts a maintenance-free, space-saving design and can be installed on walls, antenna masts or in tunnels. Thanks to its low power consumption and passive cooling, it is ideal for use in areas where power supply is critical or where there is a need for battery-based, portable base station solutions. With the expansion of the TETRA network, different public safety forces such as police, firefighters and emergency response in the State of Alagoas will share the network to facilitate optimal cooperation when the situation requires, which is another big step forward by the local authorities to improve the security of the state.

On September 2, torrential rain caused mountain flood and massive landslide swept Mengdong Town of Yunnan province in southwestern China. Local transportation, electricity and communications network were disrupted.At 9:00PM, in order to reinforce local rescue forces, Yunnan Provincial Fire Brigade dispatched 24 vehicles and 130 firefighters, who later experienced serious challenges in communications in areas where intermittent voice call and short messages in cellular service was available only on heights. Hytera swung into action immediately after being notified about the firefighting department’s emergency communications requirements. Hytera iMesh broadband network solution A Hytera technical team brought the latest emergency communications equipment with them and joined the firefighters onsite. The team quickly set up an ad hoc wireless network with Hytera iMesh broadband networking solution. This broadband network has been facilitating real-time audio and video communications and coordination between the onsite forces and the Provincial Fire Brigade command center. Multiple casualties have been reported and more people are missing. The relief effort is ongoing.

The ban on U.S. government usage of Chinese-made video surveillance products was signed into law last year and was scheduled to take effect a year later – on August 13, 2019. With that deadline looming, there are questions about whether government agencies and departments will comply in time. A year ago, the U.S. Congress passed, and the President signed, a ban on government uses of video surveillance equipment produced by two of the world’s top manufacturers – Hikvision and Dahua. The provision was buried in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2019, which the President signed into law on August 13, 2018. The ban, which takes effect ‘not later than one year after … enactment’, applies not only to future uses of Dahua and Hikvision equipment but also to legacy installations. Tracking software to detect banned products Forescout Technologies, San Jose, California, provides software to track various banned devicesThe bill calls for an assessment of the current presence of the banned technologies and development of a ‘phase-out plan’ to eliminate the equipment from government uses. One problem is identifying where the surveillance equipment is being used, which involves either a tedious manual process to search out the equipment or the installation of tracking software to identify it on the network. A federal Department of Homeland Security program called ‘Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation’ requires use of a detection tool to find any banned products on a network. Forescout Technologies, San Jose, California, provides software to track various banned devices, but not all required agencies have complied with a mandate to secure their networks by tracking every connected device (only 35% had complied as of 2018.) “Without an automated, real-time tool that can detect all of the IT devices – computer or ‘other’ – on your network, there is simply no way to be 100 percent certain that you are compliant with these product bans,” says Katherine Gronberg, Forescout’s Vice President, Government Affairs. Difficult to determine device’s manufacturer Not all equipment is marked to identify its manufacturer; some has been rebrandedAnother problem is the existence of OEM agreements and other supply chain complications that can make it difficult to determine the manufacturer of any given device. A report by Bloomberg says: “A complex web of supply chain logistics and licensing agreements makes it almost impossible to know whether a security camera is actually made in China or contains components that would violate U.S. rules.” Not all equipment is marked to identify its manufacturer; some has been rebranded. “There are all kinds of shadowy licensing agreements that prevent us from knowing the true scope of China’s foothold in this market,” said Peter Kusnic, a technology writer at business research firm The Freedonia Group. “I’m not sure it will even be possible to ever fully identify all of these cameras, let alone remove them. The sheer number is insurmountable.” Companies banned under NDAA The NDAA ban covers “public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes.” It bans “video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced by Hytera Communications Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company, [and] Dahua Technology Company (or any subsidiary or affiliate of such entities).” Hytera Communications is a Chinese digital mobile radio manufacturer. Huawei Technologies Co. equipment has also been banned, including the HiSilicon chips widely used in video cameras. In addition to banning the Chinese equipment in government installations, the NDAA also includes a ‘blacklist’ provision [paragraph (a)(1)(B)], which could be interpreted to extend the ban to companies that use Chinese-made products in other, non-government applications. Rulemaking on that aspect is still under way, including a public hearing in July.

The devil is in the details. The broader implications of the U.S. Government ban on Chinese video surveillance manufacturers are being clarified in the federal rule-making process, and a public hearing in July gave the industry a chance to speak up about the impact of the law. Ban on equipment The hearing centered on Section 889 of Title VII of the National Defense Authorisation Act (NDAA) for FY 2019, specifically paragraph (a)(1)(B). The paragraph "prohibits agencies from entering into a contract (or extending or renewing a contract) with an entity that uses any equipment, system, or service that uses covered telecommunications equipment or services as a substantial or essential component of any system, or as critical technology as part of any system." “Covered equipment” refers to products and services from Huawei, ZTE Corp., Hytera, Hikvision and Dahua “Covered equipment” refers to products and services from Huawei Technologies Co., ZTE Corp., Hytera Communications Corp., Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Co. and Dahua Technology Co. Hikvision and Dahua are two of the largest manufacturers of video surveillance equipment, and Huawei manufactures HiSilicon chips widely used in video cameras. ‘Chinese ban’ provision The public hearing was part of the rule-making process for paragraph (a)(1)(B), which the industry has informally referred to as the “blacklist” provision of the NDAA. However, the “Chinese ban” provision [Paragraph (a)(1)(a)] is not at issue, was not covered by the public hearing, and is already scheduled to go into effect a year after the law was signed by President Trump (August 13, 2018).   There were seven presentations at the public hearing. Presenters included the Security Industry Association (SIA), two Hikvision integrators, a representative of communications manufacturer Hytera, an economist and an attorney on behalf of telecommunications company Huawei, and Honeycomb Secure Systems, a federal contractor. There was no livestream or transcription of the meeting, although PowerPoint summaries of the 10-minute presentations were published.   SIA emphasises on clarity In its presentation, the Security Industry Association (SIA) emphasised that contractors need clarity, i.e., that paragraph (a)(1)(B) applies to an entity's use of covered equipment or services in the performance of federal contracts, but NOT to non-federal sales or use of covered equipment by a contractor that is unrelated to federal work. SIA also focused on the distinction (and contrasting risk profiles) between video surveillance equipment, which are endpoint devices that may or may not be on the Internet, and telecommunications equipment. In contrast, telecommunications equipment is essential to Internet infrastructure and manages all data on a network, encrypted or not.    Fully-compliant video surveillance products Security equipment suppliers and integrators doing federal work can offer fully compliant video surveillance products" SIA's presentation included the following "outcome" statement: "Security equipment suppliers and integrators doing federal work can offer fully compliant video surveillance products in the federal market, while offering other products tailored to technical requirements, price points and specific customer needs that vary widely for non-government commercial sectors – e.g. malls, banks, convenience stores, etc.” In other words, involvement in government contracts should not restrict an integrator’s flexibility to offer any and all products and services (included those from the listed Chinese companies) to non-government customers. The two integrators made similar points, specifically about their business with Hikvision. One presenter was Rick Williams, General Manager of Selcom, a systems integrator in Selma, Ala., with 10 employees. They have been a Hikvision partner since 2012 with a year-to-date revenue from Hikvision products of approximately $400,000. Hikvision integrators speak out A second integrator at the hearing was Mark Zuckerman of Clear Connection Inc., a security company in Beltsville, Md., with 32 local employees, that focuses on electronic security, telecommunications and IT. Clear Connection designs, installs and services systems throughout Metro DC and Baltimore, including commercial entities, schools and non-profit organisations. They do about $120,000 a year in business as a Hikvision partner and have over $500,000 in business awaiting federal NSGP [Nonprofit Security Grant Program] approval. In two almost identical presentations, the integrators sought clear guidance on how to comply with the language of the law as written, specifically confirmation that Section 889 of the NDAA does not apply to non-federal sales or use of covered equipment. "This is critical to my company as I provide integrated security solutions across multiple government and commercial markets, using a mix of products from different manufacturers tailored to the technical requirements, price points and customer needs that vary widely for each sector," said Williams. Hytera speaks at hearing It is not clear what Section 889 means, who it applies to, or how far its prohibitions extend" "It is not clear what Section 889 means, who it applies to, or how far its prohibitions extend," commented Zuckerman. "If interpreted broadly, some of my customers would be barred from entering into a federal contract because they have covered products installed in their facility to protect their property and staff.” Also presenting at the hearing was Hytera, a manufacturer of open standard digital mobile radio technology. The presentation emphasised that Hytera does not sell to U.S. telecommunications carriers, and does not supply 5G components or video surveillance equipment. Hytera equipment is used by federal customers such as the National Gallery of Art, National Archives, National Zoo and the Holocaust Museum. Impact on clients and commerce "These federal entities do not play a role in national security, and the Hytera systems do not connect to any critical systems," says the company. "However, the lack of clarity in the implementation of the NDAA has a significant impact on Federal, state and commercial clients, impacting competition and choice." Hytera's presentation continues: "Hytera has never been informed by any U.S. government entity that its equipment posed a national security risk and as such has not been given the opportunity to respond to any concerns. The result of Section 889 is the creation and circulation of misinformation in the marketplace." Hytera also said that the federal proposed rules and regulations should exempt federal agencies that do not include a national security component, and equipment not interconnected with the public network. Impact on cybersecurity Consolidating the number of equipment suppliers hinders rather than helps cybersecurity" James E. Gauch, an attorney with James Day speaking on behalf of Huawei, offered a global argument that could be applied to any of the banned companies: “Virtually all equipment manufacturers rely on a global supply chain and face security risks from a wide range of sources, excluding may be one or two vendors based on their national origin will not address these risks.” He adds, “However, consolidating the number of equipment suppliers hinders rather than helps cybersecurity. Creating a small number of dominant suppliers, regardless of national origin, reduces the incentives of those suppliers to embrace industry-leading standards and creates greater exposure to vulnerabilities of a single supplier.”

I have been thinking a lot about the U.S. government’s ban on video surveillance technologies by Hikvision and Dahua. In general, I question the wisdom and logic of the ban and am frankly puzzled as to how it came to be. Allow me to elaborate. Chinese camera manufacturers Reality check: the government ban is based on concerns about the potential misuse of cameras, not actual misuse. Before the government ban, you occasionally heard about some government entities deciding not to use cameras manufactured by Chinese companies, although the reasons were mostly “in an abundance of caution.”  Even so, I find the targeting of two Chinese companies – three if you count Hytera Communications, a mobile radio manufacturer – in a huge government military spending bill to be a little puzzling. I can’t quite picture how these specific companies got on Congress’s radar. The government ban is based on concerns about the potential misuse of cameras, not actual misuse What level of lobbying or backroom dealing was involved in getting the ban introduced (by a Missouri congresswoman) into the House version of the bill? And after the ban was left out of the Senate version, was there a new wave of discussions to ensure it was included in the joint House-Senate version (with some minor changes, and who negotiated those?). It all seems a little random. Concerns for the U.S. Furthermore, the U.S. ban solves neither of the two main concerns that are generally used as its justification: Concern: Cybersecurity. The U.S. ban “solves” the issue of cybersecurity only if both of the following statements are true. No security system that uses a Hikvision or Dahua camera or other component is cybersecure. Any system that does not use a Hikvision or Dahua camera or other component is cybersecure. What level of lobbying or backroom dealing was involved in getting the ban introduced into the House version of the bill? The ban ignores the breadth and complexity of cybersecurity and instead offers up two companies as scapegoats. Our industry has sought to address cybersecurity, and the one principle that has guided that effort is that cybersecurity is an issue that must be addressed by manufacturers, consultants, integrators and end users – in effect, everyone in the industry. Cybersecurity does not begin and end with the manufacturer and banning any manufacturers from the market does not ensure better cybersecurity.  Concern: “Untrustworthy” Chinese companies. Hikvision and Dahua are only two Chinese companies. Any response to concerns about whether Chinese companies are trustworthy would need to cover many more companies that manufacture their products in China. Australian TV recently claimed that “all Chinese companies pose a risk. Because of Chinese laws, there is a requirement for companies to be engaged in espionage on behalf of the state.” Even if one embraces that extreme view, the logic fails when only two companies are targeted. One source told me that 60 to 65 percent of the global supply of commercial video cameras are manufactured in China, so it’s a much bigger issue than two companies.The Chinese government has much more effective ways of conducting espionage than exploiting security cameras And is U.S. security at risk unless or until it is cut off from more than half of the world’s supply of video cameras? Even Western camera companies manufacture some of their cameras and/or components in China. Why name only two (or three) companies, only one of which has ties to the Chinese government? If the goal of the U.S. ban was to address the possibility of cybersecurity and/or espionage by the Chinese government, shouldn’t there be other companies and product categories included? Clearly, video surveillance is not the only category that has the potential for abuse. The Chinese government has much more effective ways of conducting espionage than exploiting security cameras. Global response to U.S. ban And now that the U.S. ban has been passed, how is the ban being misused to justify a new level of alarm about Chinese companies? Australian television effortlessly made the leap from “software backdoors” to a concerted and organised effort by the Chinese government to use cameras to be the “number one country for espionage.” And it’s not just about government facilities: “Even on the street, [cameras] have the potential to inadvertently contribute toward Chinese espionage activity by providing real-time information about the situation on the ground,” says the Australian TV report. If all Chinese companies pose a risk, why is the U.S. government targeting specific companies rather than all Chinese companies? If all Chinese companies pose a risk, why is the U.S. government targeting specific companies rather than all Chinese companies, or at least those with electronics or computer products that could be used for espionage? What about the espionage potential of the 70% of mobile phones that are made in China? What about other consumer electronics such as PCs or smart TVs? How many government facilities that are eliminating Dahua and Hikvision cameras have employees who use iPhones or use other electronic equipment from China? Artificial intelligence & IP-over-coax Also, consider the impact of the ban on business. Hikvision and Dahua have had many successes in the video surveillance market, including in the U.S. market. They have added value to many integrators and end user customers. They have been on the forefront of important trends such as artificial intelligence and IP-over-coax. And, yes, they have made technologies available at lower prices.Cybersecurity issues have plagued several companies in the industry, not just Hikvision and Dahua Cybersecurity issues have plagued several companies in the industry, not just these two, and both Hikvision and Dahua have worked to fix past problems, and to raise awareness of cybersecurity concerns in general. Is a U.S. ban on two companies an appropriate response to a series of geo-political concerns that are much bigger than those two companies (and bigger than our entire market)? Should two companies take the brunt of the anti-Chinese backlash? Video surveillance cameras Is the video surveillance market as a whole better or worse for the presence of Hikvision and Dahua? Is it up to the U.S. government to make that call? In some ways, thoughts of Chinese espionage are a sign of these uncertain political times. Fear of video surveillance is perfectly congruent with long-standing anxieties about “Big Brother;” suspicion about China taking over our video cameras just rings true at a time when Russia is (supposedly) controlling our elections. But should two companies be targeted while broader concerns are shrugged off?